Research interests: causal inference, empirical industrial organization, empirical labor economics
Research
arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.10367
A growing empirical literature finds that firms pass the cost of minimum wage hikes onto consumers via higher retail prices. Yet, little is known about minimum wage effects on wholesale prices and whether retailers face a wholesale cost shock in addition to the labor cost shock. I exploit the unique market structure of Washington state's legal recreational cannabis industry to investigate minimum wage pass-through to wholesale and retail prices. In a dynamic difference-in-differences framework, I utilize scanner data on $6 billion of transactions across the supply chain and leverage geographic variation in firms' minimum wage exposure across six minimum wage hikes between 2018 and 2021. When ignoring wholesale cost effects, I find retail pass-through elasticities consistent with existing literature---yet retail pass-through elasticities more than double once wholesale cost effects are accounted for. Retail markups do not adjust to the wholesale cost shock, indicating a full pass-through of the wholesale cost shock to retail prices. The results suggest that previous research may underestimate the impact of minimum wage increases on retail prices. This paper highlights the importance of analyzing the entire supply chain when evaluating the product market effects of minimum wage hikes.
with Johannes Kasinger (arXiv preprint: arXiv:2407.07201)
This paper shows that retailers increase prices in response to organized retail crime, revealing a substantial aspect of retail crime's social costs. We match detailed information on store-level crimes to administrative scanner data from the universe of transactions for cannabis retailers in Washington state. Exploiting quasi-experimental variation from the timing of store-level robberies and burglaries, we find that crimes cause a 1.8% increase in retail prices at victimized stores. Nearby rivals of victimized stores increase prices by a similar amount with a two-month lag. Retailers’ price responses are not driven by demand effects, increased wholesale costs, or strategic price responses. Instead, they are consistent with precautionary security expenditures. We find the largest pass-through rates for independent stores and in less concentrated markets. We estimate that crime imposes a 1% "hidden" unit tax on affected stores, implying an annual negative welfare effect of approximately $30.6 million, with consumers bearing two-thirds of this burden.